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Feminist Awareness as Virtue: A Path of
Moderation
Joan Woolfrey

Westchester University

FEMINISM

“Doesn’t it make you crazy to be so consistently
disappointed?” asked my new partner. We had been watching
yet another predictable Hollywood movie and he was
showing sympathetic exhaustion at my relentless feminist
critiques. And, of course it does make me crazy. I wouldn’t
be venting my views about the failings of an entire industry
so inevitably if it didn’t. But the exchange that followed got
me thinking, as exchanges with this man often do. It is a
reflex action for me, a habit if you will, to critique my culture
from a feminist perspective. I believe this to be a positive
and important aspect of my personality. I believe this to be a
particularly moral component of my psyche. In this paper, I
wish to analyze this character trait, and in so doing make a
case for feminist awareness as virtue.
While Aristotle’s ethics opens itself to criticism from
several directions, including its blindness to color, class and
gender issues, his focus on moral virtues and their
development provide a grounding for my view that feminist
awareness can and should be an engrained character trait—
one which benefits oneself and others, that is, a moral virtue.
I suggest that Aristotle’s view of the mean, in particular, can
also aid us in understanding this feminist character trait. To
think of feminist awareness as producing responses that
occupy some middle ground between two extremes helps
to determine how best to operate in a world distinctly different
from the moral ideal we envision.

Feminist Awareness as Virtue1
Even though Aristotle would never have seen the capacity
for recognizing and responding to inequalities between the
genders as being of sufficient interest or usefulness to society
to merit its own character trait, much less a virtuous one, his
understanding of moral development could hardly be more
astute. My interest here is in Aristotle’s explication of moral
virtue. In general terms, virtues are character traits that benefit
oneself and others. To qualify as a moral virtue, (a) an action
must be a product of moral deliberation that concludes that
(b) the right response to a given circumstance falls within
some middle ground between excessive and deficient action.
Once the proper action is verified through experience, (c)
we must repeat that action regularly enough for it to become
a habit. Once it becomes a habit, we have acquired the virtue.
A virtuous person will act in virtuous ways, not because they
have to or because they know they should, but because they
want to. Their action, then, emanates from a clear
understanding of how best to act, and an emotional
investment in who one is and wishes to be. I will discuss (a),
(b) and (c) above, in turn, as regards feminist awareness,
while keeping in mind that being a virtuous person, according
to Aristotle, requires a good deal more than the nurturing of a
single virtue.2
Practically any activity done repeatedly can find its way
into our psyches. For instance, how we tie our shoes, our
lovemaking and our responses to injustice, all contain more
or less automatic elements, developed over time through
repetition. Feminist awareness as virtue specifically involves

the acquisition of the habit of recognizing that males and
females tend to be treated differently in this society for morally
unjustifiable reasons and that this has a particularly negative
effect on women.
Mere recognition of right and wrong will not suffice,
however. Virtue will not develop without virtuous action.
Becoming aware of gender stereotyping, gaining a
consciousness about the barriers created by that stereotyping,
and reaching the conclusion that such limitations are morally
wrong, will likely, I argue, compel one to work for change,
thus engaging one in the performance of virtuous action. If
such action does not become habit, no virtue will be
forthcoming. Making the awareness of gender inequalities a
habit, however, will create the virtue by repeatedly compelling
the action.

Moral Deliberation
If one possesses practical wisdom, according to Aristotle, and
the proper guidance, a person can learn to desire to act in
ways that benefit themselves and their community. I will
assume, rather than use space to argue, that the recognition
of gender injustice and the accompanying need to act based
on that recognition is just such an advantageous virtue. It
requires an accumulation of observations, insights, and, likely,
some instruction or encouragement. Such experiences must
be processed or studied, in order to reach morally valid
conclusions about the gender inequities in the world. With
practice, such individuals will have the capacity to make
decisions based on their best judgment, and will thus create
habits which make the best moral virtues.
In my view, education, observation and deliberation
together can lead one to develop habits beneficial to living in
community with others. This coincides with Aristotle’s view
of virtue. I discuss this combination of elements below.
Education: Education may come in many forms: growing
up in a feminist household, taking a women’s studies course,
picking up a book with a feminist bent, or developing a
relationship with a seasoned feminist. These are a few
examples of how our community serves to influence us. A
Letter to the Editor of Ms. magazine illustrates this influence:
I don’t know where I’ve been. It was only when I
was looking for a copy of “something new for my
clients to read” that I discovered Ms. As a 36-yearold hairdresser, I am so tired of looking at fashion
magazines filled with emaciated women! Your
magazine had stories I loved reading, stories about
women who were worth reading about (Brogan
2001, 4).
I suggest that the author of this letter has gained some
insight from her recent reading. She is discovering that men’s
domination and women’s subordination do not define the
necessary state of the world. Her recent reading has taught
her that cosmetics and sex tips do not constitute the sum
total of worthwhile topics for and about women.
Observation: The letter suggests that this hairdresser has
been closely observing the world she lives in prior to finding
the magazine. She has been comparing it to the world
presented to her in the fashion magazines that fill salons
around the country. I suggest that she has noticed a striking
incongruity. She describes the women she sees in fashion
magazines as “emaciated.” She believes fashion models are
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too thin. She wishes to give her clients a different, perhaps
more realistic, version of their world. A magazine that talks
about all kinds of women making positive, powerful,
differences in the world would answer that wish.
Deliberation: She possesses practical wisdom. She has
reached the conclusion through her observations that women
are being sent a destructive message. Perhaps she has seen
such messages played out in the lives of her clients who may
suffer from eating disorders or are convinced they will not be
loved unless they meet some unattainable physical standard.
She has judged the bulk of the writing in “women’s”
magazines to be useless, not worth reading. Moral
deliberation has delivered her to respond by subscribing to
Ms. Such responses embody the first steps toward developing
the virtue of feminist awareness.

Virtue as Character Trait
As Aristotelian ethics maintains, virtues are not virtues unless
they accord with feelings. If I am to be virtuous as regards
feminist awareness, I must develop my sense of gender
injustice so that it becomes a part of my character; so that
my emotions correspond with my rational ability to make
decisions and generate action (Aristotle 1963, 308-09). To be
virtuous regarding feminist awareness, deliberation must have
previously assured me of the moral unacceptability of sexism
and oppression. Initial attempts to react well to situations of
injustice will have produced satisfaction and knowledge.
Convinced that sexism harms, I will learn over time how to
temper my response to gender inequities based on my
audience, my own needs and the desired effect. In the course
of time, this aspect of my character will take on a more and
more seasoned and permanent place in my personality. If I
practice it consistently, I will be honing my abilities by
developing habits I truly value.
Whether I am a stay-at-home mom or an accountant or
an astronaut, developing feminist awareness as virtue will
require education, observation and deliberation. Such a
process can come through many kinds of activities. For
example, reading groups, trips to the library, and open
discussions with partner and friends, encompass a few of the
ways to encourage a consciousness of injustice. Keeping a
close eye on my actions and their consequences, examining
sources of injustice, and discovering alternative ways of
acting, will help to encourage the development of feminist
virtue. If repeated year in and year out, such a conscious,
active examining will evolve into habit, and, thus, a virtue. I
will begin habitually to see the inequities, and I will come to
automatically respond in what experience has taught me is
the right way. But, like the commitment to quitting smoking
or eating healthier, if one is not constantly vigilant, one’s habits
will not be formed as one’s deliberation dictates. We must
choose to consistently repeat those activities that would
create the habits we want.
Aristotle believed the right response to any given situation
would be the mean between two extremes. In the next
section, I suggest that feminist awareness qualifies in this
regard as well.

Virtue as the Middle Ground
The emphasis on virtue as inhabiting the middle ground
between excess and deficiency deserves consideration.
Almost every time my partner and I sit down to watch a video

or go out to a major Hollywood film, I can expect to have my
feminist sensibilities battered a bit. Most films treat women
as minor characters, as incidental to the real action of the
story, as love interests, as passive plot points, or as mere
adornments. In general, I am more likely than not to
experience a degree of disappointment with the film
industry’s slow progress towards the equitable treatment of
women. Films may still be worthy in other ways—as art, as
cultural commentary, or as entertainment—and I should have
the capacity for appreciating them as such (perhaps a virtue
of a related sort). But if I am virtuous as regards feminist
awareness, being conscious of gender injustice will translate
into some appropriate action, and I argue that that response
should demonstrate moderation. If I react excessively to every
male dominated film I see, I will wear myself out. I will be
burdensome to others. I will be directing my anger at the
world in a most ineffectual way. I might alienate my friends,
exasperate my partner, and internalize an unproductive
bitterness for which I do not have the time or the
temperament. Conversely, if I react with a less than moderate
response as regards awareness of gender injustice, I will be
on the road to passive acceptance of the current state of
things, and will be headed toward the loss of the capacity for
this sort of moral deliberation. Since virtuous acts need to be
repeated until they are habits, if I am not repeating virtuous
action, I am not developing virtue. I may even be unlearning
that virtue. Further, I will be perpetuating the current
environment by not drawing attention to gender injustice, by
seemingly demonstrating silent agreement with the status
quo.
I believe that Aristotle makes a strong case for the
moderate response as the most ethical response, but as he
reminds us, the moderate response depends on the person.
“The mean [is] relative to us...” (Aristotle 1963, 308). How
useful this ultimately makes the concept has been a matter
of debate for centuries, but through a few examples I hope to
lend some support to the effectiveness of this line of thinking.
First of all, according to Aristotle, people who have less
restrained temperaments must work hard at controlling their
less moderate desires while temperate people find such a
task to be quite easy. He suggests, further, that knowledge of
one’s strengths and weaknesses will help one gauge the
moderate response for a given situation.
For example, if I am a confident, informed, gregarious
person with a ready wit, I may have the capacity for dealing
with a potentially volatile but isolated case of sexual
harassment in a different way than would a more reserved
and serious type of person. I might use my charm to diffuse
a potentially explosive situation and make a delightfully
persuasive point without attacking anyone. A more reserved,
serious person trying the same approach would likely come
off sounding wooden or false. The less extroverted but equally
confident person might, instead, produce a clear and
convincing set of arguments that explain why particular
actions create problems in the workplace, again without being
directly accusative. However, someone new to the world of
feminist awareness, someone without many survival skills,
someone more vulnerable than the people in my first two
examples, may need very responsibly to obtain the support
of her institution’s complaint process or choose the legal
route. In our pursuit of virtue, we need to develop the ability
to assess situations with a clear understanding of our own
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talents and limitations. Invoking the right response depends
on knowing our strengths and weaknesses, as well as being
attuned to the nature of each situation.
Some will argue (bell hooks, for instance) that a
moderate response may not send the message home, that
anger at injustice should not be squelched (hooks 1989, 129).3
Some will argue that diplomacy will look too much like
acquiescence, that if a good deal of forcefulness does not
accompany the message that the message will be dismissed.
I believe my view is not at odds with this perspective. In
Aristotle, and throughout the history of moral philosophy, it
has been acknowledged that morality cannot be known with
certainty. Deliberation about our actions is required, but only
experience will confirm or deny that our responses were
adequate. Part of the deliberation required for the
development of feminist awareness as virtue involves
perceptiveness regarding one’s audience. If I am downing a
couple of ales and playing pool in a working-class bar with
folks I know to be unaware of feminist issues in any reflective
way, I will respond differently than I would if surrounded by
academic colleagues dismissive of issues of gender injustice
who should know better. If I have been playing pool in a
neighborhood bar with someone who tells me I play “pretty
good pool for a girl,” I am likely to control any cutting remark
itching to come off my lips. I might rather, in the course of
the evening, look for some gentle, good-humored feminist
suggestion with which my comrade would be hard pressed
to disagree. Maybe we will compare years of pool experience
or “training” grounds to see what differences suggest
themselves along unjustifiably gendered lines. Perhaps there
will be a chance for me to point out some gender inequities
of other kinds without being preachy. Or, perhaps, this time,
I will just let it go, playing a few more games in relative silence
to emphasize my abilities. It will depend on my pool opponent
and how I read the moment.
If I am interacting with colleagues with as much or more
academic experience as I, I will not be looking for subtle
approaches. If a colleague told me, for instance, that I have
an amazingly good understanding of Kant for a female, I would
be much quicker to respond.4 Someone who has been to
graduate school within the last 20 years or has been in
academia long enough to have been exposed to important
changes regarding gender relations has at least been notified
of the guidelines necessary to avoid sex discrimination suits.
Academics in this sense should know better. Therefore, the
more exquisitely patient and tactful approach demonstrated
in my pool hall example would not be appropriate. Such a
response would be deficient because it would be masking
the indignation I would experience at not being respectfully
treated by a colleague. The comment regarding my
understanding of Kant appears to be intentionally sexist—at
the very least, careless—and such comment deserves a
response that directly addresses that negligence.
If I am in the midst of people accustomed to
communicating at a level of emotional intensity foreign to
the mass of white middle-class America (of which I am one),
I would want to raise or lower my own intensity to match
theirs, in order to best communicate. This suggests that I
would need to be sensitive enough to the people with whom
I am interacting to intuit how best they communicate.
Many versions of care ethics emphasize the need for such
perceptiveness. Attending to that conversation can help to

nurture the development of feminist awareness as virtue. Nel
Noddings, for instance, discusses the caring relationship in
terms of “relatedness” and “engrossment.” She argues that
we have to hone our capacity for perceptiveness in order to
care for others ethically (Noddings 1984, 30-37).5 For María
C. Lugones: “To know one’s self and one’s situation is to
know one’s company”(Lugones 1991, 35-36). Lugones argues
that our relationships contribute to who we are. As a white
person, coming to understand specific experiences of other
ethnic groups will give me better tools for communicating,
for finding the right response. The better I know myself and
my circumstances, the better I know those in my community.
If I am a woman just coming to an understanding of grave
injustices she has suffered, who has been trained to suffer in
silence since before she could speak, my mode of
communication may well be outside some norm of
moderation. Feminist awareness would ensure my anger
would be palpable and my “mean” would very likely be
extreme, compared to others. But that anger would still have
to be controlled for me to be virtuous. I would be angry for
the right reasons, at the right people, and in an amount that I
had assessed as the right amount. My response should still
be within the mean, relative to me. It could not be deficient,
some stony sullen silence which could be misinterpreted or
written off. And it could not be the other extreme. Excess in
such a case would border on the out-of-control, on the
unreasonable, and thus the incommunicable. If my rage
reached beyond a sensible decibel level, if it became
incoherent, if it were too often veiled in tears that silenced
the words, its source would not be communicable. My
moderate response should make clear to a thinking adult that
harm has been done. To be virtuous as regards feminist
awareness, I must have the capacity to articulate how I have
been harmed.
The notion of moderation that I am suggesting can be
imagined as operating on a kind of sliding scale depending
on the individual and the circumstance. The development of
feminist virtue entails evolution — Aristotle says a lifetime of
training. The subtleties of assessing one’s audience and one’s
own needs and developing the corresponding habits will
come with time if one stays alert to the inequalities of the
world and the duties to one’s self and those to whom one is
relating.

Feminist Awareness as Process
I have argued that feminist awareness can be viewed as a
virtue. What I have said so far implies that we can know the
right response for every situation, given enough deliberation
and experience. Sandra Bartky speaks to this point with her
notion of “double ontological shock” (Bartky 1990, 18). For
Bartky, upon reaching feminist awareness, we experience the
shock that comes with understanding that the world is not
the way we thought it was. But, in addition, we have the
shock of ambiguity, of realizing we are not guaranteed to be
right regarding our new interpretation. Bartky speaks of the
potential for paranoia, suspicion and self-doubt (Bartky 1990,
18). My own experience supports Bartky’s view. When I have
to double-check the name tag on the man in front of me to
assure myself that he is the nurse sent to summon me to my
cousin’s bedside; when I do not call the male student on his
inappropriate eye contact; when the 11-year-old girl from next
door comes to help me move and at her mother ’s
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Notes
1. While I discuss the virtue of being aware of gender inequities in
this paper, the ideas put forth here could as easily apply to awareness
of racial and other injustice.
2. A virtuous person is one who has trained and nurtured a number
of virtues into a well-balanced, harmonious character, over a lifetime.
Feminist awareness is by no means the only virtue that should be
cultivated.
3. In Talking Back, for instance, hooks speaks of confrontation as
being the necessar y mode of communication for many (see
especially pp.129-133).
4. This specific scenario has in fact never occurred in my academic
career.
5. While I do not agree with this particular approach to care ethics
as a whole, I find Noddings’s understanding of the need to discover
the viewpoint of the other as particularly important in the
development of moral character.
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Feminist Ethics and Anger: A Feminist
Buddhist Reflection1
Wendy Donner

Carlton University
Feminist care ethics began with the thesis that there is a
distinctive feminist moral experience (Jaggar 1991, 81).
According to Elizabeth Spelman, the ethics of care involves
the claim that emotions play a central role in human life and
in moral sensibility (Spelman 1991, 216). It aims to overcome
dualisms and to bring balance to the relation of reason/
emotion, heart/mind and to reduce the control of reason over
emotion in moral experience and agency. The feminist ethic
of care has been a powerful challenge to and antidote to many
traditional masculinist theories that, it is argued, place too
much emphasis upon universal justice principles, rights
claims and the role of reason. Since feminist care ethics aims
to revalorize the role of the emotions in moral experience,
there have been notable defenses of the role of anger in
fighting oppression and promoting healing and self-recovery.2
This raises the issue of anger’s potential as natural, creative
energy. Some feminist accounts of anger do not, then, see
anger as always being a vice and sometimes view it as a
necessary evil, that is, as morally justified under certain
conditions. Some see it as a virtue in some contexts.3
Recently, feminist Buddhist writers have also sought to
revision anger’s place in feminist thought and in Buddhist
philosophy and meditation practice. An examination of the
contribution of this perspective promises to enrich and
deepen understanding of feminist care ethics and of feminist
virtue theory, in particular. In the context of feminist virtue
theory, Buddhist feminists advance arguments that maintain
that in some circumstances anger has the potential to do
good, by promoting spiritual and emotional healing and
awareness, as well as by challenging patriarchy. Thus anger
can be virtuous if rooted in compassion and wisdom.
Rita Gross, in Buddhism After Patriarchy (1993), has led
the way in the feminist reconstruction of Buddhism in its
movement into the West. The foundational teaching and
philosophy of Buddhism and its basic meditative techniques
begin with the Four Noble Truths. The Four Noble Truths
explore the nature and causes of human suffering or
dissatisfaction (‘dukkha’ in Pali or Sanskrit), as well as the
end of and liberation from suffering. The cause of dukkha or
dissatisfaction is attachment, craving, or holding on to the
objects and experiences we desire. The end of suffering or
liberation from suffering is nirvana. Lama Surya Das explains
that “nirvana is inconceivable inner peace, the cessation of
craving and clinging” (Das 1997, 84). It is nonattachment,
release, openness, and emptiness. Nir vana can be
experienced in a moment simply by letting go of craving,
clinging, attachment and delusion (Das 1997, 85). The positive
program provides methods for self-development. Basic
Buddhist meditation techniques emphasize that
to dismantle ego and undercut its pain-producing
tendencies, ongoing disciplines of meditation and
contemplation are essential. In the simple and basic
practices of mindfulness and awareness, one is
taught how to experience thoughts without
repressing them, judging them, or acting them out.
One is taught to observe and notice, to increase
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encouragement I relegate her to sweeping while boys carry
boxes; in these and many other circumstances I am not
exerting the same feminist virtue I have been extolling in this
essay.
Yet, I believe that feminist awareness involves a process.
That it may never be a completed process fits closely with
what the development of virtue requires. Bartky writes that,
as feminists, we have no “fully formed moral paradigms”
(Bartky 1990, 20-21). Much of what we do as feminists gets
made up as we go along. Still, the more experience we have
making “it” up and observing its effects, the wiser and more
confident we will become. The more practice we get
deliberating about our world and acting in it, the closer we
will be to shaping habits worthy of moral virtue. Despite the
ambiguity that Bartky insists comes with feminist
consciousness, we have the capacity to cultivate our practical
wisdom. We have the capacity to develop feminist awareness
as virtue.

